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Abstract
Business models have received increasing attention in both academic and managerial communities. However, little
attention has been paid to how business models change in response to extreme events. This topic is of critical importance
since failure to achieve adaptation in a timely manner can lead to negative consequences such as a significant decrease in
firm value or bankruptcy. This study explores how the business model paradigm of the Portuguese footwear industry
changed following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. The empirical results suggest that the shock
acted as a trigger for change for the Portuguese footwear firms which reflected in the adoption of a new business model
characterized by speed and flexibility in the manufacturing process, faster response to customer needs and, in specific
cases, in downward integration through the creation of own brands selling directly to final consumers. This result,
however, was not the outcome of a sudden change but rather the consequence of a planned adaptation strategy led by a
key industry actor that acted as a network orchestrator coordinating the actions of the Portuguese footwear firms. The
implications of these findings as well as directions for future research are discussed in the last part of this study.
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Introduction
The footwear industry consists of all firms active in the
production of all types of men’s, women’s, and children’s
shoes. This is a very complex industry with a fragmented
value chain in which large companies coexist with smaller
and more specialized firms. During recent years, the indus-
try has experienced a stable rate of growth and, according
to recent forecasts, this trend is expected to continue going
forward. Specifically, in 2015, the global market reached a
value of US$270,136 million, showing a compound annual
growth rate (CAGR), in the period 2011–2015, equal to
5.2%.1 Similarly, for the period 2015–2020, the expected
CAGR is forecasted to be 5.8%, driving the industry to a
value of US$358,583 million by the end of 2020. The larg-
est segment of the industry is represented by women’s
footwear, accounting for 53.9% of the total value. Men’s
footwear, instead, accounts for a further 28.1% and, finally,
the children’s segment covers the remaining 18%.
More interesting data come out from a geographical
segmentation of the market. The Asia-Pacific zone
accounts for 33.7% of the global market, reaching a value
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of US$91,163 million in 2015 and showing a CAGR of
9.4% during the period 2011–2015. In comparison, the
European and US markets cover 28.3% and 24.9%, respec-
tively, reaching values of US$79,437 and US$67,253 mil-
lion in 2015. The main reason behind these interregional
differences can be traced in the economic and financial
crisis that affected more heavily US and European consu-
mers over the period of analysis. As a consequence, Asia-
Pacific countries have started relying increasingly less on
exports and more on their domestic markets. This trend is
expected to lead to a greater share of the global growth of
consumer spending in the emerging markets in the coming
years. In Europe, although growth remained weak, the mar-
ket has seen some acceleration recently. Further increase is
expected for the next 5 years, moving the CAGR from the
current 1.3% toward 2.7%. United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Italy, and Spain account for almost 60% of the
European market with the first two countries expecting the
highest growth.
The competitive environment is reflected in these figures
especially from the point of view of the relationship with the
final consumer. In fact, looking at the footwear retailing, the
industry is highly fragmented, even if the market is domi-
nated by large retail groups with a high degree of rivalry.
One of the main competitive factors is represented by price.
In fact, since it reflects the quality of the final product,
pricing strategy is the principal mean to segment the market
and draw niches of consumers. Moreover, like any other
industry based on design and creativity, styles and brands
are very useful instruments to compete with rivals on the
market. The traditional footwear delivery, based on two sea-
sons, is radically changing toward the fast-fashion environ-
ment. Although consumers recognize the value of a brand
and the heritage of some firms acting in the industry, they are
increasingly buying shoes on impulse and expect to see a
more rapid change of assortment with diversity. Therefore,
managerial efforts are turning on devising strategies that
enable products to be created, manufactured, and delivered
based on “real-time” demand.2
All these aspects are reflected in the business model
concept that aims to understand how to create and deliver
value for customers, generating, at the same time, value for
the firm.3 In other words, business models help to transform
the top management’s strategic decisions in operative
actions. More recently, the business model concept has
progressively attracted the attention of researchers and
managers due to its increasing importance in coping with
turbulent environments such as the footwear industry. Con-
sequently, the business model is not only seen as the instru-
ment to design value creation and distribution processes,
but it also represents the means to plan and execute adapta-
tion strategies. As such, it has been used to analyze firms’
reactions to competitors’ strategies or to adjust product
characteristics to changing market preferences or consu-
mers’ behavior.4 Nevertheless, to the best of our knowl-
edge, this conceptual framework has not been properly
developed to analyze the response of firms to exogenous
shocks such as financial and economic crises or disruptive
changes in the competitive environment. This article aims
at filling this gap by focusing on one of the most significant
events that hit the industry in the past decades: the entry of
China into the World Trade Organization (henceforth
WTO) at the end of 2001.
In order to study the effects of this rare event on the
footwear industry business model, using both archival and
survey data, a rich longitudinal analysis of the Portuguese
footwear industry is conducted over a period of more than
20 years. This is a particularly interesting setting for several
reasons. Portugal is a country with a long tradition in the
footwear industry, mainly producing leather shoes destined
to foreign markets with Europe being the main target of
such exports. Moreover, although Portuguese footwear
manufacturers, similar to other countries such as Italy and
Spain, are small- and medium-sized, their average size is
higher than the average of footwear manufacturers in the
European Union. Finally, focusing on a localized territorial
scope—such as Portugal—allowed us to analyze the local
competitive environment more thoroughly and define the
boundaries of our analysis.
The empirical outcomes highlight how the shock acted
as a turning point that led Portuguese footwear producers to
a relevant change in their business model, stressing features
such as speed and flexibility in the manufacturing process,
quicker response to customer preferences, and, in specific
cases, the development of new product lines based on the
creation of own brands offered directly to final consumers.
The results point out to another important finding. The
successful transition to a new business model in the post-
shock era was not the outcome of a spontaneous adaptation
process but rather the result of a planned transition orche-
strated by a key industry actor, Portuguese Footwear, Com-
ponents, and Leather Goods Manufacturers’ Association
(APICCAPS).
Background
The business model concept has gained increasing popu-
larity over recent years and has become a frequent object of
study in management research. For instance, a search of
academic articles using the term “business model” revealed
166 such articles between 1975 and 1994, and 1563
between 1995 and 2000.5 Despite the proliferation of stud-
ies on business models, there is still lack of consensus on
what a business model is. One of the first definitions of the
term business model was proposed by Timmers who
defined it as “an architecture for the product, service and
information flows, including a description of the various
business actors and their roles; a description of the potential
benefits for the various business actors; a description of the
sources of revenues” (p. 2).6 Later, definitions focused
mainly on identifying the components of a business model.
For example, Osterwalder and Pigneur argue that a
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business model can be described as a canvas through sev-
eral basic building blocks that cover some of the main areas
of a business, such as customers, offer, infrastructure, and
financial viability that illustrate how a company intends to
make money.7 Similarly, Johnson et al. identify four ele-
ments of a business model (i.e. customer value proposition,
profit formula, key resources, and key processes) that,
when they work together, create and deliver value for cus-
tomers.8 Recent surveys of the literature on business mod-
els indicate that discrepancies in the uses of constructs,
definitions, and operationalization are still present.9
One possible approach to solve the puzzle of which
definition should be adopted is to choose the definition that
best fits the empirical context in which a business model is
analyzed. A finer-grained distinction could be, for instance,
made by choosing which components of a business model
to analyze based on industry characteristics. For instance,
in a study of airline business models, components were
identified starting from the business model conceptualiza-
tion of Osterwalder and selecting among the nine compo-
nents identified by this author the ones that would best
describe an airline business model.3 This filtering process
led to the selection, and in certain cases, renaming of the six
most suitable components, including value proposition,
revenue streams, network, distribution channels, fleet
structure, and alliances.10 Thus, a context-specific defini-
tion of a business model promises to provide a more precise
identification of which elements or components should be
considered in the analysis on a case-by-case scenario.
In this study, we follow the definition of business model
proposed by Zott and Amit who proposed a relational view
of business models, defined as the structure, content, and
governance of transactions.11 This definition is particularly
suitable for the analysis of the relationships chain that
involves manufacturers, distributors, and consumers. Spe-
cifically, given our interest in exploring business models in
the footwear industry, we look at different models of pro-
duction that can be described along a continuum having
“scheduled-based production” and “ready-fashion” at the
two opposite ends and “fast-fashion” or “semi-planned
production” in the middle. Building on previous research,12
we adopt a definition that stresses the following elements as
necessary parts of a business model: (1) market perfor-
mance (measured in terms of total turnover), (2) customers
(viewed as geographic target markets), (3) placement stra-
tegies to reach target markets, and (4) costs borne by firms.
Business model adaptation and
exogenous changes
Gradually, research on business models has been moving
from a static to a dynamic view of business models. In other
words, instead of describing a business model in a partic-
ular moment of time, scholars have begun to examine how
business models evolve, change, and reconfigure over time.
While this nascent stream of literature has been focusing
mainly on business model innovation, other terms have
started to appear such as “evolution,” “reconfiguration,”
and “adaptation.”13–15 While innovation, when attached
to business models, is defined as the process by which firms
actively innovate their business model to disrupt market
conditions, the focus of this article is on how business
models change in response to an external trigger. These
changes have been defined as business model adaptation,
that is, the process by which firms align their business
model with a changing environment.15
The idea that firms respond to external stimuli by chang-
ing or reconfiguring their strategy and practices is well
established in the literature. With respect to business model
adaptation in response to external stimuli, previous
research has analyzed how business models adapt to
changes in the competitive environment and changes
brought by new technologies.16,17 Other studies have
linked changes in business models to unusual events or
shocks. For instance, using a large sample of Norwegian
firms across several industries, Saebi et al. studied how
managers introduced changes in their business models such
as increasing sales efforts to new customer segments in the
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.15 Using a qualitative
approach, Bogers et al. studied business model evolution by
looking at one single firm in the airline industry.18 Despite
using distinct methodological approaches, both studies
reached the conclusion that business models are not
immune to external changes.
The limited amount of studies linking business model
adaptation to the external environment calls for more stud-
ies in this domain. This topic is of critical importance as
failure to adapt business models on time can result in
diminished returns and, in extreme cases, in bankruptcies
and firm death. An interesting opportunity is provided by
the possibility to study how and if new business model
paradigms emerge in the aftermath of exogenous events.
Previous research has documented that disruptive changes,
such as in case of exogenous shocks, interrupt equilibria
making it possible for novel organizational mutations,
intentional or random, to take hold.19 Subsequent periods
of flux endure until a dominant design emerges. This
punctuated-equilibrium perspective studies firm evolution
as being composed of two distinct and recurring phases: (1)
long periods of quasi-equilibrium, during which firms
make small changes in structure and activities and 2) brief
periods of disequilibrium, during which deep change can
take place.19,20 In light of these theoretical developments,
we posit that business model adaptation could result in the
establishment of a new and shared dominant business
model paradigm following a shock.
Business model adaptation and central
network actors
What is the role of networks in the process of business
model adaptation? This is an important yet understudied
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question since firms are embedded in networks made of
competitors, collaborators, suppliers, and institutions,
among others that affect firm strategy and behavior.21
Thus, we argue that the choices firms make with respect
to their business models may be influenced by their net-
works (i.e. the ties they maintain with other actors). While
networks emerge and develop as actors make choices about
whom to connect with and what to transact without being
guided by any specific actor, other networks are intention-
ally shaped by one or more actors.22,23 Evidence of this
latter form of networks has been found, for instance, in
supply chain networks as well as in entrepreneurial net-
works and innovation networks.24–27 Orchestrated net-
works are characterized by the presence of key agents
also known as network “orchestrators” that “act as a broker
to plan and coordinate the activities of the network as a
whole.”22
Orchestration can take two separate forms—closed- or
open-system orchestration—depending on the role played
by the central network agent.28 Closed-system orchestra-
tion is the set of purposeful and deliberate actions under-
taken by key agents to coordinate and harness “the
dispersed resources and capabilities” (p. 659) of network
members.29 These key agents are typically self-interested
and have as a primary goal the maximization of their own
benefit. Such actors are often referred to as hub firms or
anchors30 and can be found in R&D consortia as well as
government-sponsored programs. In an open-system
orchestration, instead, central actors in the network are
mainly focused on supporting members’ dispersed and
largely independent search for new business opportunities
rather than trying to extract value from members as in the
case of closed-system orchestration. Business incubators
and associations of small- and medium-sized enterprises
are examples of open-system orchestration.
Finally, previous research has indicated that orchestra-
tion should be considered as a set of evolving rather than
static actions.31 However, the same authors consider net-
work orchestration as an endogenous process where the
orchestrator works to address emergent dilemmas disre-
garding the possibility that action could also be triggered
by external and episodic events. This, we believe, is an
important limitation which we address here by proposing
that the ability of an orchestrator to influence the evolution
of an industry network is also driven by external changes.
Data and methods
This research aims to explain how the business model para-
digm of the Portuguese footwear industry changed in the
face of an exogenous rupture in the system: China’s entry
into the WTO in 2001. To do so, we build on a case-based
method that is particularly suitable for understanding
poorly understood phenomena32 with multiple and com-
plex elements that evolve over time.33 Our choice of a
longitudinal approach with a single case study32 is
grounded in the fact that this approach is particularly suit-
able for studying the evolutionary processes of business
models.13 Our study extends over the period 1995–2016,
although our main focus is on the years preceding and
following China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. We identify
three subperiods that reflect our interest in exploring
changes in business models before (1995–2001), during
(2002–2005), and after (2006–2008) the shock.
We draw on several data sources that include both sur-
vey data as well as data obtained from APICCAPS’ annual
reports, and EUROSTAT. Financial and accounting infor-
mation was obtained through the Sistema Anual de Bal-
ances Ibe´ricos (SABI) database which holds accounting
data on Iberian companies. SABI’s data are available only
from 2002 onward which does not allow us to compare the
pre- and post-shock results in terms of market performance.
However, this should not be a problem as previous studies
have also limited their analysis to post-shock effects.15
These data are then confronted with the results from the
quarterly business conditions survey that has been adminis-
tered to the members of APICCAPS on an ongoing basis
since 1995. We have therefore access to both primary and
archival data which allows us to triangulate different
sources effectively.
We chose the Portuguese footwear industry for our case
study for several reasons. First, the firms populating the
Portuguese footwear industry were not immune to the sig-
nificant changes that took place in the external environment
following China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 and reacted
to them by modifying the way they delivered and captured
value (i.e. their business model), making it an ideal context
in which to study how shocks affect structure and strategy.
Second, this setting is attractive because orchestration pro-
cesses were central to how firms reacted to the shock, thus
illustrating how business associations add value for their
members.32 Finally, several contributions have used the
broader fashion industry as an empirical setting,2,34 includ-
ing contributions focusing specifically on business models
in the footwear industry.12
The Portuguese footwear industry
Although footwear production has a long tradition in Por-
tugal, in the last 20 years, the industry went through a
profound transformation and is often presented as one of
the Portuguese economy’s success stories. Footwear now
accounts for more than 6% of the country’s manufacturing
employment and almost 4% of Portuguese exports. Portu-
guese footwear exports have the third highest unit price
among the world’s leading exporters, after Italy and
France. This is partially explained by Portuguese speciali-
zation in leather footwear which is an expensive material
compared to other countries, such as Spain, that export a
higher proportion of rubber, plastic, or textile shoes.
Around 95% of the Portuguese footwear manufacturers’
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production is destined to foreign markets, with Europe
being the main target of such exports.
Although Portuguese footwear manufacturers, similar to
other countries such as Italy and Spain, are mostly small-
and medium-sized, their average size is 26 employees
which is higher than the average of footwear manufacturers
in the European Union. The Portuguese footwear industry
is prevalently located in the north of the country and is
organized into two geographic clusters separated by some
80 km: the towns of Felgueiras and Guimara˜es forming one
and the towns of Feira, Sa˜o Joa˜o da Madeira, and Oliveira
de Azeme´is forming the other. These two clusters account
for about 75% of the sector’s employment and exports. This
geographic concentration has been a key strategic advan-
tage for the industry, allowing for an easier access to ser-
vices and materials needed for the production, a faster
diffusion of knowledge, and the creation of both formal
and informal networks.
Most Portuguese footwear firms specialize in shoe man-
ufacturing itself, not being present in upstream or down-
stream segments of the industry nor on the related leather
accessories industry. However, sometimes, especially in
the case of larger firms, a few players have integrated
downward, retailing shoes under their own brands. There
are also several cases of quasi-integration, both upstream
and downstream, with legally independent firms, owned by
common shareholders, being present at different levels of
the value chain. Figure 1 shows an overview of the vertical
structure of the industry.
Adapting to an exogenous shock
Between 1974 and 1994, the Portuguese footwear industry
developed at fast pace: the number of companies increased
by 143%, employment by 286%, production by 626%, and
exports by more than 1600% (Table 1). Portuguese low-
production costs, particularly labor costs, coupled with
easy access to large markets resulting from proximity and,
since 1986, membership in the European Economic Com-
munity, sustained this growth. These conditions guaranteed
the international competitiveness of local producers and
attracted foreign investment from countries such as the
United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, and France. The
main value proposition of Portuguese firms, in this period,
was to deliver long series at low prices for large global
brands and retailers such as Marks & Spencer. Several
international brands, such as Clarks (United Kingdom),
Rohde (Germany), and ECCO (Denmark), had their own
Figure 1. The vertical structure of the footwear industry.
Table 1. Overview of the Portuguese footwear industry evolution (1974–2014).
Years 1974 1984 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Number of companies 673 971 1635 1645 1432 1346 1441
Employment 15,299 30,850 59,099 53,375 40,255 32,510 38,594
Gross production value (million €) 12 319 1620 1731 1471 1415 1886
Exports (million €) 3 164 1284 1486 1273 1232 1846
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manufacturing facilities in Portugal, which were among the
largest of the Portuguese footwear industry.
This state of affairs was disrupted by China’s accession
to the WTO in 2001. China offered much lower labor costs
and a productive capacity that Portugal could not match.
Building on its economic reforms, China was able to rap-
idly expand trade and attract high levels of foreign invest-
ment, just like Portugal had previously done, but on a much
amplified scale. Between 2000 and 2005, the Chinese foot-
wear exports increased by 120%, raising China’s share of
the world footwear market from 21.6% to 30.7%, and this
trend continued in the following years. This put enormous
pressure on European producers and particularly on Portu-
guese producers that saw their competitive advantage
overturned.
We treat China’s entry into the WTO as an exogenous
shock affecting the Portuguese footwear industry and study
how Portuguese firms responded by implementing signifi-
cant changes in their business model. The analysis of foot-
wear business models is structured following the approach
proposed by Pirolo et al. who define business model in this
industry as a model that comprises four dimensions,
namely market performance, customers, placement strate-
gies, and costs.12 Given our interest in understanding how
and if the footwear business model changed in the after-
math of China’s entry into the WTO, we follow previous
studies by focusing on each dimension individually before
detecting an overall change in the business model.35
China’s accession to the WTO had a double negative
impact on the Portuguese footwear industry. On the one
hand, Portugal lost appeal to large international buyers for
whom the production cost economies obtained in Asia for
large orders more than compensated any additional trans-
portation costs. As a result, Portugal was no longer com-
petitive for buyers looking for long series at low prices and
the increased competition resulted in a decrease in Portu-
guese producers’ market share. On the other hand, several
large foreign firms closed their factories in Portugal or
significantly reduced their activity, and transferred them
to Asia.
The impact of the shock on market performance is evi-
dent in the responses to the question “How were the busi-
ness conditions for your firm in the previous quarter?”
included in APICCAPS’ quarterly business conditions sur-
vey. The results (Figure 2) clearly indicate a sharp dete-
rioration of perceived conditions between 2002 and 2005.
However, this is followed by a recovery from 2006 through
2010—except for the immediate aftermath of the 2008 glo-
bal financial crisis—and a relatively stable, predominantly
positive, situation since then which is indicative that the
Portuguese industry was able to reestablish its competitive-
ness on new grounds. A sharp decline in 2002–2005 is also
visible when analyzing data on footwear production, in
volume (Figure 3). The decline is followed by a milder fall
up to 2010 and a clear recovery from then on. Recovery
starts earlier, already in 2005, if the value of production is
considered instead, as the unit price of Portuguese footwear
has been growing consistently, which is further evidence
that the industry was able to find a new successful business
model. Data on footwear firms’ turnover and profit
extracted from SABI, although only available from 2002
onward, show a pattern that is consistent with the previous
results. The average turnover of the top 100 firms in the
post-shock window was 30% higher than that in the shock
period, while their average profit was 114 times higher. We
performed several analyses using different sample sizes but
did not find significant variations.
The impact of the shock is also clear in terms of geo-
graphic target markets. Portuguese footwear firms had been
traditionally exporting to clients located in neighboring
Figure 2. Quarterly business conditions of the Portuguese footwear manufacturers. WTO: World Trade Organization.
Source: elaborated from APICCAPS data.
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countries, confirming that geographical proximity facili-
tates buyer–supplier relationships.36 The shock reinforced
this behavior. In fact, the percentage of Portuguese foot-
wear exports going to the European Union went up from
67% in the pre-shock period to 74% during the shock and
81% in the post-shock period. This result was also largely
due to the increased Chinese competition that made it
harder for the Portuguese firms to compete in large non-
European markets such as the United States and because
the competitive advantages that the Portuguese firms devel-
oped under the new business model were particularly effec-
tive at moderately short geographic distance. But, inside
Europe, the relative importance of some markets changed
quite dramatically. In 1999, one year before China joined
the WTO, the United Kingdom was still Portugal’s largest
export market and, together with Germany, represented
almost half of Portuguese exports. By 2005, this was down
to one-third and the United Kingdom had fallen to the third
place among main markets (Figure 4). Besides the top 5
markets, exports to Denmark, another relatively important
market, followed a similar trend. These results are directly
justified by the closure or reduction of activity of the Por-
tuguese factories of firms such as the United Kingdom’s
Clarks, Germany’s Rohde, and Denmark’s ECCO, and by
the fact that the United Kingdom and Germany became
important buyers of Chinese footwear.
As these countries’ share in Portuguese exports fell,
others’ have increased. More specifically, France became
Figure 3. Annual production in pairs of the Portuguese footwear manufacturers. WTO: World Trade Organization.
Source: elaborated from APICCAPS data.
Figure 4. Top 5 markets for the Portuguese footwear manufacturers. WTO: World Trade Organization.
Source: elaborated from EUROSTAT data.
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the main market for Portuguese footwear, with its share
going from an average of 18% in the pre-shock period to
28% in the post-shock period. The Netherlands and Spain
also gained considerable share. Being unable to compete
head-to-head with the Chinese footwear producers in the
supply of large orders, Portuguese manufacturers adapted
their business model by focusing on market segments of
lesser volume but of greater value added. Rapid response
and flexibility in production, accepting very small orders,
became key to their market positioning and were particu-
larly relevant for nearby buyers such as those located in
Spain and France. Portuguese footwear firms also invested
considerably in the development of their own collections,
instead of passively responding to buyers’ requirements,
and some invested in the creation of their own brands.
Additionally, they started competing for the orders of
smaller retailers instead of the large international brands
as done previously. By 2009, while the Portuguese export
value was about 10 times smaller than the Chinese one, its
average export price was about 8 times higher.37
The new business model required a significant change in
the commercial strategy of Portuguese footwear firms. In
the past, these firms had mostly worked as subcontractors
for a few large buyers that required little active commercial
activity. This meant that often it would be the buying firm,
or some intermediary working for it, that would contact the
manufacturers asking for a particular order. Following the
shock, instead, the Portuguese footwear manufacturers had
to actively seek customers for their own collections which
they did by stepping up international promotion initiatives
(Figure 5). The number of companies attending interna-
tional fairs as well as the number of international events
with Portuguese presence almost doubled in the post-shock
period compared with the pre-shock period. This finding
confirms previous theoretical research arguing that manag-
ers are more motivated to take action and break inertia
when confronted with uncertainty.38
Additionally, many firms invested in creating new
brands, such as the Lemon Jelly brand launched by Procal-
c¸ado, or buying existing ones, such as the acquisition of the
British Fly London by Kyaia. In terms of distribution, a
large number of Portuguese footwear producers rely either
on a private distribution network or on intermediaries, and
very few brands use flagship stores to distribute their prod-
ucts, a pattern that is consistent with previous research in
other contexts such as Italy.12 Another aspect suggesting a
more proactive posture of Portuguese footwear firms is
their behavior in terms of protection of intellectual prop-
erty, which has little tradition in the industry. In 2002, the
Footwear Technological Centre of Portugal (CTCP) set up
an office to assist firms on such matters, and in the follow-
ing years, the registration of brands, models, and patents
increased exponentially, as the Portuguese footwear brands
Figure 5. Commercial strategy of the Portuguese footwear manufacturers. WTO: World Trade Organization.
Source: elaborated from APICCAPS data.
Figure 6. Registration requests supported by CTCP.
Source: elaborated from APICCAPS data.
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became increasingly a desirable target for imitation and
counterfeiting (Figure 6).
The available evidence does not suggest that the shock
significantly changed firms’ cost structure. It might be sus-
pected that the new business model, with average shorter
orders and more demanding development and commercial
activities, might have required higher labor costs as a per-
centage of turnover. However, our data do not confirm this.
If anything, this percentage fell moderately in the post-
shock period (2006–2008). Several factors may have con-
tributed to this result. During the shock period, due to legal
restrictions on layoffs, firms accumulated slack, which
somewhat increased their labor costs. Slightly increased
sales and exports in the post-shock period may therefore
have allowed for a reduction of their weight on turnover.
Confirming this, average labor costs again increased in
2009, when production fell anew. On the other hand, many
of the foreign-owned firms that left Portugal in the shock
period were, in relative terms, among the best-paying
employers. By itself, their departure will then have led to
a reduction in average labor costs. Further, their departure
greatly reduced demand and increased supply in the foot-
wear labor markets, changing the equilibrium to employ-
ers’ advantage.
In a nutshell, the Portuguese footwear industry
responded to the external shock by embracing new com-
petitive logics which consisted in the transition from a
“passive” business model, in which firms responded to
large orders placed by few large buyers such as interna-
tional retail chains and multinational footwear brands that
would specify the design of the shoes to be produced, to an
“active” business model, in which producers develop their
own collections to be sold mainly to small retails chains,
either under producer brands or on “private label,” and
compete mostly on quality, design, and rapid response.
This change required the development of new competences
in product development, operations, logistics, as well as
commercial activities. As a result, production and exports
have been growing consistently over the last 7 years. These
endogenous changes, however, were coupled with several
initiatives orchestrated by APICCAPS which together
resulted in an effective adaptation on the part of these
firms.
APICCAPS as a network orchestrator
APICCAPS, the Portuguese footwear manufacturers’ asso-
ciation, was created in 1975. A distinguishing feature of
APICCAPS, among Portuguese trade associations, is that
since its inception, it did not limit itself to be an advocate
for the industry. Since 1978, every 5–7 years, the associa-
tion has published a strategic plan for the Portuguese foot-
wear industry that guides its activity and tries to orchestrate
the efforts of an industry composed of more than 1000
firms. These plans are the result of widely participated
processes in which the association spends considerable
time and resources, with the benefit of increased legiti-
macy. In these 40 years, these plans have inevitably
evolved but a few common themes remain and have set the
course for the industry and the way it dealt with the external
shock analyzed here: acceptance of competition, innova-
tion, and internationalization. Unlike many of its counter-
parts, in Portugal and abroad, APICCAPS did not take a
purely defensive stance toward foreign competition.
Instead, it embraced competition leading to a Schumpeter-
ian renovation process and tried to stimulate its members to
prepare for challenges ahead. Innovation and international
promotion have been two priorities in terms of its activity.
Innovation efforts are mostly conducted through CTCP
in which APICCAPS participates. Through CTCP, the
association has been promoting R&D programs through a
model where, for each initiative, a consortium is created
Figure 7. Illustration of the Portuguese footwear business model adaptation.
Note: This figure is not based on actual measurements but rather meant for illustrative purposes.
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involving scientific institutions, technology producers, and
potential users of the technology. A particularly successful
initiative, for example, was the Portuguese Footwear Fac-
tory of the Future (FACAP) program between 1995 and
1999 that led to the development of multiple equipment for
the industry. Anticipating problems ahead, the generation
of solutions that would increase productive flexibility was a
central goal of the program. FACAP was key to the devel-
opment of water jet leather–cutting technology which was
extremely significant for the increase in flexibility of Por-
tuguese footwear manufacturers and, therefore, instrumen-
tal in the response to increased competition from Asia.
For more than two decades, APICCAPS has been incen-
tivizing and supporting its associates to develop interna-
tional promotion initiatives. In the first stages of these
efforts, when Portuguese firms had very little experience
in dealing with international markets, this was done mostly
through the organization of a professional fair in Portugal,
MOCAP, through which the association tried to attract
international buyers. Progressively, however, the focus was
moved to the participation in fairs abroad. APICCAPS
plays a dual role regarding these activities: on the one hand,
it negotiates the Portuguese participation with the organi-
zers, logistic providers, and other suppliers, allowing
associates to benefit from increased bargaining power, and
on the other, it tries to obtain external funding to support
this sort of initiative. The main trigger to this shift has been
once again China’s accession to WTO which increasingly
made it clear that the presence abroad was more effective
than attracting buyers to Portugal. Therefore, the industry
stepped up its efforts abroad, by involving more firms in
fairs and by including more fairs in the promotion programs
(Figure 5). Such behavioral change was driven not only by
the necessity to serve new markets but also by a higher
recognition by these firms of the role that the association
could play as a tertius iungens between Portuguese foot-
wear companies and new clients.39 Thus, the shock legiti-
mated the role of APICCAPS as a network orchestrator as
the Portuguese footwear companies realized the value of a
higher level of embeddedness in the global footwear indus-
try network compared to a more peripheral position. Figure
7 summarizes our findings by illustrating the coevolution
of business models, the network orchestrator, and the exter-
nal environment.
Conclusion
Adopting a dynamic approach to the study of the business
model, this article explored how business models change in
response to variations in the competitive environments.
More specifically, the results of the study indicate that,
on the one hand, new relevant business models emerge in
response to exogenous events that affect the industry and
on the other hand, the emergence of these new business
models may be influenced by the social structure in which
firms operate. To explore these intuitions, the Portuguese
footwear industry has been chosen as the empirical setting,
analyzing how firms in this industry modified their busi-
ness model when faced with a major exogenous event rep-
resented by the entry of China into the WTO in 2001.
The Chinese accession to the WTO can be considered a
disruptive occurrence because it put significant competitive
pressure on European footwear manufacturers, particularly
impacting those that were highly exposed to international
markets such as the Portuguese ones. This has led the Por-
tuguese footwear companies to review their business model
in order to cope with the price-based competition of Chi-
nese producers. Among all the changes adopted by the
Portuguese footwear producers, perhaps the most note-
worthy is the adjustment made in their commercial strat-
egy. Portuguese footwear producers, traditionally,
responded to large orders placed by a few large interna-
tional buyers. In the aftermath of the shock, this “passive”
business model was replaced by an “active” model in which
manufacturers put more emphasis on design and marketing
activities with the goal to sell their products to small retai-
lers and distribution chains. This process required the
development of new competences in product development,
operations, logistics, as well as commercial activities which
was gradually achieved through the support of a key indus-
try player—APICCAPS—that orchestrated the network of
relationships inside the industry. In sum, this change in
business attitude by the Portuguese footwear firms indi-
cates that severe negative shocks require an equally strong
response, based on an adaption strategy aimed to align
firms’ business model with the changed competitive land-
scape in a rapid and effective way.
As with any research, this study comes with some lim-
itations that outline the directions for future research. First,
the nature of the exogenous shock we focused on in this
study may pose some limitations to the generalizability of
our results. Although China’s entry into the WTO took
place in 2001, disrupting significantly the equilibria of the
footwear and other manufacturing industries, this event and
its consequences were to a high extent predictable. Thus,
our results could represent an optimistic account of foot-
wear firms’ ability to adapt their business models in the
face of an exogenous shock. To that respect, it would be
interesting to explore in this or other settings business
model adaptation in the aftermath of an exogenous and
unexpected event.
Second, it is important to underline that most of the
Portuguese footwear production relies on the use of leather,
corresponding to 80% of the pairs produced and to 90% of
the production value in 2016, for example. Heavy specia-
lization in high-quality materials has been a source of com-
petitive advantage for Portuguese footwear producers in the
past years and helped these firms weather the uncertainties
in the post-shock period. Yet, new players such as Belgium
and the Netherlands focusing on cheaper materials such as
rubber are gaining momentum which may pose a threat for
the Portuguese firms’ future growth. To that respect, two
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distinct business models are worth noting here. One, where
manufacturers mainly export their own production and
another where they reexport footwear imported from other
sources. The latter model has been gaining momentum
especially in countries that have limited manufacturing
activity. Future studies may explore this additional chal-
lenge faced by countries such as Portugal or Spain that have
a more consolidated manufacturing tradition.
Finally, the strengthening of its position outside the Eur-
opean markets should be seen as a priority for the Portu-
guese footwear industry as diversifying the markets served
is a way to reduce the threats associated with future down-
turns. Recent data seem to confirm this trend as countries
such as Australia and the United States have registered
three-digit growth in 2016 compared to 2011. One example
of a company that has heavily focused on nontraditional
markets for the Portuguese footwear companies is the brand
Josefinas for which the United States has become the big-
gest market representing 35% of the total sales. Future
studies may explore the role that such pioneering firms play
in the industry’s internationalization process in nontradi-
tional markets.
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